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Abstract:
Border studies in South Asia privilege everyday experiences, and the constructed nature of
borders and state sovereignty. This article argues that state elites in India, Pakistan and
Afghanistan during the 1950s-60s actively pursued territorial sovereignty through border policy,
having inherited ambiguous colonial-era frontiers. Comparing security and development
activities along the Durand Line, between Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the better-known case
sovereignty required a bounded space that only borders could provide and a rejection of
competing border zone authorities. The local specificity of each border, however, created the
historical conditions in which political elites acted. Combining an archival history methodology
with conceptual insights from political geography and critical international relations, the article
uses an original integration of two important Asian border spaces into one analysis in order to
The early 1960s were tumultuous in South Asia.
West Pakistan in 1960, Pakistan and Afghanistan had only just normalized their political
relations when war broke out between Pakistan and India. Muslim guerrillas, and later Pakistan
Army forces, invaded Indian-controlled Kashmir in 1965; Indian forces retaliated by invading
Pakistan and marching towards Lahore. While an uneasy peace was quickly enforced, the region
was shaken. In the course of six years, Afghan armed forces had crossed into Pakistan; Pakistani
2forces into India; and Indian forces back into Pakistan. This series of events shared a key
dispute and Afghan refusal to recognize the Durand Line as an international boundary unhinged
regional relations and created internal insecurities.
Sovereignty and borders have been key concerns across the humanities and social
sciences during the past two and a half decades, particularly in the analytical deconstruction of
-states (Agnew 1994). International relations theorists have shown that
McNamee and Mills 2012; Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011). Instead governments must actively
construct sovereignty through the arrogation of exclusive rights making laws, minting money,
administering justice, coercing - thus positioning themselves to be recognized as equals by the
governors of other states and acquiring the ability to participate in the international system (see
Gould 2012; Gowler and Bunck 1996; Barkin and Cronin 1994). Territoriality the ability to
enforce a writ over a particular geographical space or spaces plays a key role in this conception
of modern statehood (Maier 2012). If states require a bounded territory in which to exercise
authority, then the edges of these territories could be read simply as sites where sovereignty
ends. In practice, state boundaries serve as sites for the performance of sovereignty. Militarized
border landscapes, customs and passport controls, and the regulation of border traffic and
parcel of asserting sovereignty. Consequently, borders, their formation, and their regulation have
attracted a great deal of scholarly attention (Häkli 2008; Agnew 2008; Bruslé 2013; Wilson
2014).
3Imperial histories have demonstrated the complicated relationship between colonial
sovereignty and border-making (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Baud and Van Schendel
1997). Borders circumscribed spaces where the colonial state ostensibly could and should
manifest its rule and apply its visions of modernity. Certainly, however, this was not a
straightforward narrative. The drawing of borders created not only cartographical and territorial
problems particularly when lines on maps only vaguely followed logical geographical or
ethnographic contours but also issues in citizen-state relations. Indigenous populations had
little reason to recognize these newly drawn boundaries, though borders increasingly created
opportunities to negotiate with or subvert the colonial state, complicating imperial projects (see
Scott 2009 for a southeast Asian example). Decolonization historiography demonstrates that
when empires ended, they by no means left colonial borders and modern nation-states as their
inevitable successors (Collins 2013; Haines 2015). Schemes for federation and other devolved
sovereignty arrangements competed with nationalist movements which demanded territorial
states as the European empires crumbled after the Second World War.
In South Asia, an important arena for decolonization and postcolonial politics, both
historians and geographers have highlighted the complicated nature of state-building and its
associated social and political production of borders and nationalized spaces in the wake of the
1947 partition. While older work on partition focused on anti-colonial
nationalism, Muslim separatism (Robinson 1974), and the postcolonial construction of nation-
states (Khilnani 1997; Jalal 2014), such work recognized but did not problematize borders. More
recent works have highlighted the territorial concerns of partition, especially the role of territory
in pre-partition Muslim political imaginations and the difficulties that accompanied the drawing
of the Radcliffe line that ultimately divided India and Pakistan (Devji 2013; Dhulipala, 2014; on
4the boundary commission, see Chester 2009). In recent years, borderlands and partition studies
have intersected. In crucial work, Van Schendel has demonstrated how South Asian states and
their representatives trying to "inscribe the border in the landscape" faced failure as a result of
local geographies and resistance from communities (non-state actors) (Van Schendel 2004, 16).
Scholars have emphasized the lived experiences of people who traverse borders, or whose paths
borders block, particularly in the case of the mass migrations across the newly drawn Radcliffe
northeast (Chatterji 1999; Zamindar 2007; Cons 2013; Jones 2009; Hussain 2013). Beyond Van
Schendel, few scholars have united the theoretical perspectives of borderlands literature with
studies of elite postcolonial politics.i
This article therefore examines the role of centralized governing authorities in the
production of discourses linking sovereignty, territory, and border-making. Sovereignty is not a
given. Borders are not simply, or simple, dividers between geopolitical blocs. Seeing how
policymakers in postcolonial states such as Pakistan and India (and even Afghanistan, whose
history was indelibly linked to that of colonial India, despite never officially belonging to the
British Empire (Hopkins 2008)) made territorial claims, articulated the relationship between
politics and ideologies behind postcolonial state-making. This article shows that when elites
attempted to impose sovereignty on space and borders on territory, they treated these acts of
sovereignty-making and border-construction as part of a natural, inevitable process through
which the post-WWII world was zoned into nation-states, despite the fact that these policies
often conflicted with, or were undermined by, lived realities of borderland inhabitants.
[Fig. 1 here]
5Van Schendel and Abraham have argued that the political and geographic limits of
sovereignty inherent to borderlands imply the presence of competing authorities (Van Schendel
and Abraham 2005). We take a regional comparative approach to the issue of South Asian
sovereignty and border-making in the aftermath of decolonization to demonstrate that South
Asian state actors largely refused to recognize competing authorities, strictly maintaining the
paramountcy of the state up to its borders -independence regional
relations has largely focused on moments of conflict and upheaval, such as partition in 1947 and
the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. But border disputes were ongoing and had widespread
ramifications for almost all South Asian countries and their relations with each other and their
neighbors. This article seeks to integrate histories of Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan countries
that have rarely all been considered in one analytical frame. It thereby highlights similarities and
differences between these three countries, which share common legacies of engagement with
British colonialism, but which have followed very different post-colonial trajectories. To do so
we analyze two disputes, which, between them, spanned three countries: first, the India-Pakistan
dispute over Kashmir; second, the contest between Pakistan and Afghanistan for control of the
ethnically Pashtun-dominated North-West Frontier Province and tribal zone (otherwise known as
Our study demonstrates not only the complexity of regional geopolitics, but the
convergences and divergences in the ways that state representatives have attempted to assert
their sovereignty in border zones.
While the Kashmir dispute perhaps is better known, both disputes greatly influenced the
development of regional relationships in South Asia from the moment of independence. The
ceasefire line in Kashmir (now known as the Line of Control) and the Durand Line that separates
6both remain highly problematic today. India and Pakistan still dispute the status of Kashmir,
while -
cross-border drone strikes. Moreover, they represent two very different types of borders, as this
North-East Frontier Agency from China-held Tibet), officials wrestled with colonial precedent.
emerged after 1947. Rather than analyze the two lines as sources of military conflict, this article
demonstrates that governments in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan have sought various ways to
assert sovereignty without resorting to official violence.
This article therefore addresses the issue of sovereignty and borders in northwestern
South Asia between the end of the British Raj in India in 1947 and the Indo-Pakistan war of
1965. While the solidification of previously fluid colonial frontiers into bordered, national zones
may seem a logical given of the transition from empire to nation-state (Adelman and Aron 1999,
816), our analysis of South Asia reveals a far more complicated story of postcolonial state- and
border-building that involved both reconciling the inherited complexities of colonial borders, and
grappling with the exigencies of newly-drawn borders. Merely to accept that borders became
more rigid ignores the moment in decolonization when borders were by no means certain and
when the size, shape, and nature of the state and its peripheries were far from clear (see also Van
Schendel 2002a). Van Schendel and Scott, among others, have highlighted the "plurality of
identity repertoires" that exist among populations that live on the borders of the state (Scott
2009, 255; Van Schendel 2004). This equally applies to communities in the Afghan-Pakistan
borderlands and Kashmir, which, in the words of Marsden and Hopkins, are "composed of a
collage of interlinked and overlapping spaces" whose populations assume a variety of ethnic,
7social, political, and familial identities depending on their context (Marsden and Hopkins 2011,
4). But critically, state actors frequently have resisted recognizing these multiple, entangled
identities, instead promoting specific state-driven identities.
Border-making consequently created contradictions and hypocrisies for nation-state
builders: in both Pakistan and India, political leaders did not follow one single logic of border-
formation or recognition. Instead, border-making highlights the far more emotive, fraught
processes by which colonial states became nation-states. Different logics underpinned sovereign
territorial claims in different borderlands, and even these logics did not remain static.
In this article, we first examine the various justifications that leaderships in India and
Pakistan used for their continuing involvement in Kashmir and its relationship to their national
sovereignties. This is followed by commensurate propositions emanating from Pakistan and
Afghanistan relating to the Durand Line. This comparison demonstrates that no consistent logic
existed governing territorial claims in the region; the specific histories of the ceasefire line and
rcut such rhetorics of rule, drawing on examples
of competitive economic development, governing structures, and the material nature of each line
to argue that their actual effects on people living in those regions were highly contingent. There
is, therefor
arrangement: every border is unique. Yet we show how border settlements highlighted the
anxieties of postcolonial state-making, and how new states actively worked to ensure their
presence was felt in regions that had once been considered peripheral. Nationalist rhetoric,
development, relationships of governance, and the militarization of landscapes were all key to
the performance and institutionalization of sovereignty.
8Material for this article is drawn from multiple archives in several countries and Indian
and Pakistani national newspapers. The Indian and Pakistani archives both present the
perspectives of bureaucrats and politicians, usually located in cities well away from the
borderlands they wrote about. However, this is not to say that the archives present homogenous
viewpoints. Official correspondence reveals discussion, dissent and the dynamic nature of border
policy-making. While we are not able to access the view of officers or civilians living
in border zones, a direct comparison of Indian and Pakistani official discourses on
postcolonial borders has not, to our knowledge, been attempted before. To address the many
gaps and silences in South Asian archives, not least the unavailability of Afghan sources, we
consulted diplomatic archives in the United States and United Kingdom.ii Western documents
reveal discussions about South Asian borders in the State Department and Foreign &
Commonwealth Office. These are rich and valuab
the region, if not always well-informed. More importantly, diplomats stationed in India, Pakistan
and Afghanistan continually spoke with national officials, and reported back their words. The
ways that South Asian leaders framed their problems and actions to foreign interlocutors reveals
the images that they wished to project. Each source shows various biases whether in terms of
anti-Indian or anti-Pakistani rhetoric in the Pakistan and Indian archives, respectively, or an
orientalist assumption of tribal backwardness in the British and US sources but consulting a
variety of source bases enables us to make a reasonably assertive argument.
Moreover, p - e of official archives enables us to
This
perspective enables us to test scholarly border theory, largely formulated in the context of
ethnographies of everyday borderland lives, against historical examples of state-driven
9territoriality. As we will show, the presumed fluidity and fixity of borders were characteristics
that elite, central policymakers deployed as they sought to make and remake national territories.
Rhetorics of control
Indian and Pakistani policymakers clashed in their visions for border-making in Kashmir,
differing in their interpretations of the relationship between state sovereignty and territoriality.
Under the terms of independence, the rulers of pre-
and Kashmir, were given the option to choose integration into India or Pakistan, or remain
autonomous (as were Pashtuns, organized into tribes in what became northwest Pakistan). For
Kashmir, which was contiguous to both countries and which had a Hindu ruler but a largely
Muslim population, the choice was not clear-cut. The state was historically a buffer between the
British Raj and its rival empires Russian and Chinese. Despite a history of conquest from the
plains, particularly the Mughals, Afghans and Sikhs in the sixteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries respectively, Kashmir was not historically integrated into lowland state-building
projects. It had a distinct tradition of autonomy (Zutshi 2015). Yet, as a relatively recent polity, it
also lacked the cultural cohesion that characterised other upland areas, such as "Zomia", the
highland zone of South-East Asia that encapsulated a distinct cultural and political identify for
residents who were nevertheless split between multiple states (see Van Schendel 2002b). As the
transfer of power approached, therefore, Kashmir's place in subcontinental geopolitics was
unpredictable. The Indian National Congress (representing India) and the Muslim League
(representing Pakistan) developed ideological and strategic interests in the state (Talbot 1998,
113-14; Copland 1991, 47-67).
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After the British ceded power in the subcontinent on August 14-15, 1947, Maharaja Hari
Singh prevaricated over whether to join India, Pakistan, or attempt to remain independent.
Muslims in Poonch, western Kashmir, rebelled against the Maharaja in the same month. They
received
frontier (and low-level Pakistani officials). The Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession to
India on October 26 in order to receive military aid (Gupta 1966, 111-24). In May 1948,
Pakistani regular forces began formal operations in Kashmir. Fighting finally ended between
Indian and Pakistani troops in January 1949, when the United Nations imposed a ceasefire
(Schofield 1996, 119-60). The ceasefire line, which separated Indian and Pakistani troops, has
since formed a de facto border between Indian-held and Pakistan-held territory.
[Fig. 2 here]
Neither Indian nor Pakistani authorities considered the ceasefire line to be a permanent
border, merely a convenient point to halt the fighting (Times of India 1949). The distinction is
important. As Taylor (1994) has argued, in the modern international system, the border is
omy
and culture. indicated that neither side
considered Indeed, leaders from both
sovereignty: on one hand were
Indian and Pakistani justifications for continuing interventions and influence over the state
(usually involving the entirety of Jammu and Kashmir), and on the other was the issue of
Kashmiri self-determination. These perspectives frequently came into conflict. Yet the ceasefire
increasingly colored As
much as both states claimed the line was a temporary measure, they increasingly expressed rigid
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notions of it as a border separating Indian and Pakistani zones of influence and consequently
spoke of the two divided regions of Kashmir as different wholes. In practice, if not in theory, the
line looked increasingly like the edge of a state-container.
Fraught relationships between notions of sovereignty and the material line of control that
divided spheres of authority provoked inconsistent Indian and Pakistani governmental positions
on the meaning of Kashmiri self-determination. While the possibility of a plebiscite to enable
Kashmiris themselves to vote to join India or Pakistan was first suggested in October 1947,
successive UN efforts to bring it about have failed (see Panigrahi 2009, 92-8). One reason was
the ween the Indian- and Pakistan-administered
parts of Kashmir. Because Indian leaders claimed that the accession to India in October 1947
was legally binding, they viewed the whole as an integral part of Indian territory (1952, 48). In
1955, Pandit Govind Va
the Kashmiri people had already declared their wish to integrate into India through their support
(which was closely allied to the Congress
party in New Delhi) (NARA 1955b). The ceasefire line here figured as a divider between
- hat tyranny reigns not on the
Indian side of the cease-
In 1957, an Indian Ministry of External Affairs briefing further argued that while India
respected the principle of self-determination, it applied only to whole nations, not to parts of one
such as Kashmir. Treating Kashmir as divisible from India would, t
12
UN: could the principle of self-determination extend to parts of existing states (see Mazower
2009)? By arguing that it could not, Indian leaders evoked a classically Westphalian notion of
borders. To them, the ceasefire line fenced in an Indian national space. Despite the Indian
c
it treated the division as finite. Nehru
even suggested at one time a formal partition of the State reflecting that enacted by the ceasefire
line (UKNA 1949).
In contrast, the Pakistan government invoked the right of all Kashmiris to self-
determination often finding echoes in the national press, as when in 1957 Dawn reported
-fire lin
holding widespread popular rallies in favor of a plebiscite (Dawn 1957a). The Pakistan
plebiscite. For example, in 1958
the chief minister of West Pakistan, Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbash, publically claimed that Indian
authorities intended to re-arrest Shaikh Abdullah to deny Kashmiris the right of self-
determination (NARA 1958). At least in diplomatic discussions, Pakistani officials continued to
refer to Kashmir as a whole that needed to be reunited. though in practice, as we shall see, the
official focus remained on Azad Kashmir.
Neither Pakistani nor Indian discourses made reference to the interests or views of
Kashmiris themselves. Like the drawing of the partition boundary in Punjab and Bengal in 1947,
there was little room in elite imaginings of sovereignty for the complexity of borderland
identities. In Kashmir, border-making was a top-down process. The nature of the border, and the
characteristics of political space on either side, resulted from the tensions between formal
sovereignty claims and de facto, militarized power.
13
The dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan over the Durand Line separating the two
countries differed significantly from the dispute between India and Pakistan over their
respectively held areas of Kashmir. Unlike the arbitrarily drawn ceasefire line, the Durand Line
had historical roots. It was established in 1893 by the British negotiator, Sir Henry Mortimer
Durand, and Afghanist
concerns. Like Kashmir's ceasefire line, however, its placement was arbitrary: for example, it
split Waziristan, the homeland of local Wazir Pashtuns, between the two states, ensuring a
boundary that did not match local ethnic and cultural realities, a point addressed in the next
section (Omrani 2009, 185). Critically, the 1893 agreement never made clear whether the Durand
Line should be considered an international boundary or a less formal frontier. Agreements
between Amir Amanullah Khan and British officials following the 1919 Anglo-Afghan War,
however, seemed to confirm that the Afghan government recognized the Durand Line as
delimiting the Afghan state (Haroon 2011, 107).
easefire line, which neither Indian nor Pakistani representatives
Afghanistan. Pakistani officials adhered to the precedent of the 1893 and 1919 legal agreements
between their British colonial predecessors and Afghan representatives. Afghan leaders claimed
that these colonial-era procedures had not actually defined the Durand Line as an international
boundary. The transfer of power created new opportunities for Afghanistan. Like India and
Pakistan, Afghanistan was also transforming. From the late 1940s, the royal family pursued
foreign economic aid while taking slow steps to liberalize governance and modernize
decolonization, officials saw an opportunity for
political and territorial expansion. Ethnic Pashtuns of -West Frontier Province
14
(NWFP) and tribal zone shared ethnic, cultural, and social ties with the large Pashtun population
in Afghanistan. The Afghan ruling family itself was ethnically Pashtun, and still provided
financial allowances to tribes on both sides of the Durand Line.
[Fig. 3 here]
future, particularly as British negotiations made clear that tribal Pashtuns could enter new treaties
with their neighbors upon independence. As with Princely States like Kashmir, the tribal areas of
northwest and northeast colonial India were not part of directly British-ruled India; instead they
had longstanding treaty arrangements that were intended to keep local tribes quiescent and
nominally attached to the Raj (Ali 1990, 94). In June 1947, Afghan leaders demanded two
opportunity for an Afghan mission to participate in the transfer-of-power negotiations. The
governments in London and Delhi refused (Mansergh and Moon 1982, no. 377; Ali 1990, 97-
100). As independent Pakistan materialized, In
agreement that undermined the new state before it even gained autonomy (or set a precedent for
other secessionist movements across South Asia). If the British had consented, Pakistan would
have crumbled, its geographical presence shrivelling. The Afghan Minister for Foreign Affairs
nevertheless maintained, even after the British announced their plan for withdrawal and partition,
ormed the
Afghan demands subsided briefly in late 1947, but shortly after Pakistani independence,
Afghan officials approached the Government of Pakistan concerning the future of the Pashtuns.iii
In 1948, Najibullah Khan, the Afghan special envoy, provocatively submitted a treaty
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(meaning ethnic Pashtuns) and a redefinition of
the Afghan-Pakistan border, as the Afghan state refused to recognize the Durand Line (NAI
hough not provincial,
] independence and that she never wished to bring military or non-military pressure to
The statement seemed to imply that Pakistan would accept some
limited form of sovereignty at the Durand Line, pointing towards a more complex model of state
space than the simple inside/outside distinction that underpins the assumptions of the modern
international system (see Walker 1993). Najibullah took this statement and further talks with
-General Mohammed Ali Jinnah to mean that the Government of Pakistan
agreed with the Afghan position and would allow self-determination for ns. His
perspective reflected the assumption that rather than the border separating zones of authority, the
supposedly "Pastun" ethnic characteristics of space and territory would produce an appropriate
(trans)border regime. In his conception, Pakistan's Pashtun population meant that an ethnically
defined space or zone, rather than a line, separated Afghanistan and Pakistan (on scales of
borderlands spatiality, also see Van Schendel 2004, 7-8; on statist conceptions of space
underpinning border-formation, see Elden 2010).iv
Pakistani officials refuted this with their attachment to the Durand Line. Foreign Minister
Zafrullah Khan, ironically echoing Indian Home Minister Pant on Kashmir,
the North West Frontier have contributed in a great measure towards the
achievement of Pakistan and when this new Islamic state was set up they expressed their firm
determination to join it. [...] They will have the same self-Government as any other part or
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan pointed to the 1947
referendum that led the province to join Pakistan, as well as the new treaty arrangements
16
: he overlooked that many in the
province had boycotted the referendum - so its outcome did not necessarily represent local
sentiment - as well as locally rooted ethnic, social, or tribal identities that likely mattered more
than being supposedly "Pakistani" (Ali 1990, 139). Officials were loath to give up the northwest
frontier, tribes and all, which comprised a significant geographical space within Pakistan.
a Pashtun homeland - dominated
relations with Pakistan. Particularly under Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud Khan, Afghanistan
refused to recognize the Durand Line, leading to border clashes and diplomatic incidents
between the two countries throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s. The Government of
Afghanista
. Pakistani officials deemed this an
"unfriendly act" (NARA 1959). In September 1960, plain-clothed Afghan army forces and
tribesmen crossed into Pakistan, only to be repulsed by the local population (NAI 1960). At the
state level, this led to a diplomatic and economic impasse, which only ended in 1963 after Daoud
was forced to resign as prime minister (Saikal 2012, 132; NAI 1964).
Seeking to undo the colonial-era Durand Line, Afghan leaders consequently sought other
justifications for their interest in Pashtunistan and arguments against the recognition of Pakistan
as the legal heir to British colonial treaties. The Afghan Government rationalized its continuing
interventions across the Durand Line in ethnic terms, calling upon a shared Pashtun heritage.
here, remembrance
of a common Pashtun history and homeland the Afghan government sought the creation of a
; also Schetter 2005). The long history of Pashtun residence
outside the extant Afghan state, and the longstanding problems of Afghan rulers in extending
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authority throughout the country, complicated Kabul's conflation of Afghan and Pashtun
identities. Yet Afghan government use
pointedly and directly associated transborder Pashtuns with the Afghan state. Broadcasts from
Kabul Radio focused on their
unite and win back our honour and prestige from the foreigners. Come let us recall our past and
e).
In contrast, Pakistani leaders worked on the assumption that they had inherited the
Durand Line as an international border. In a meeting with the Afghan Foreign Minister in
Peshawar, Pakistani reporters demanded to know why Afghanistan refused to recognize Pakistan
as the legal successor to British rule (Ali 1990, 241-2).v In the case of the Durand Line, Pakistan
took a classic modernist approa
referred to these colonial-era lines as international boundaries (Häkli 2008, 471).
However, this same logic could not be applied in the case of Kashmir. The nature of the
ceasefire line and the mode of its creation marked a sharp distinction from earlier processes of
border-making in South Asia. The ceasefire line was not intentionally created to demarcate
Indian and Pakistani spheres of influence, although this is what it came to represent. It created an
artificial borderland within the former princely state of Kashmir, despite continued Indian and
Pakistani claims regarding the entire state. Neither Pakistan nor India could draw upon colonial
precedents to justify their claims. They instead turned to international law, and more emotively
to religion and identity. Ironically
-
Pashtun population. Faced with a new borderland through Kashmir, Indian and Pakistani leaders
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could not turn to the same border logics as they did when facing irredentist claims to the Durand
or McMahon Lines.
Indeed, the zero-sum nature of competition between the various rhetorics of sovereignty
in play meant that it was difficult for all countries involved in the Kashmir and Pashtunistan
disputes to find common bases for negotiation. Neither the process of decolonization, nor any
coherent theory of state sovereignty, produced a consistent set of territorial dynamics in South
Minister, hypothetically dictated the formation and recognition of self-determination within
national boundaries, in practice these theories (then and now) did not result in any single logic
for border formation or adherence. This paradox, however, did not stop either Pakistan or India
from attempting to put rhetoric into action. On either side of the ceasefire line and up to the
Durand Line, Indian and Pakistani officials worked to match their sovereign claims with the
territorial space of the nation.
Practicalities of control
Despite the arguments made by Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan officials regarding the
future of Kashmir or the Durand Line, matters on the ground complicated putting espoused
policies into practice. Indian and Pakistani leaders may have spoken of a united (either Indian or
between Indian and Pakistani domains -fated bid to invade Indian-held Kashmir
in 1965 notwithstanding). Development initiatives and governing relationships distinguished
Indian-held from Pakistan-held Kashmir. These twin elements had an equally telling impact
along the Durand Line, where Pakistani officials focused on development as a mode for
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the funds to pursue similar development plans. But Afghan leaders continued to extend political
areas, thereby undermini -driven actions.
These differing forms of competition meant that communitie
could maintain relationships across the border, benefit from interacting with both states, and
effectively ignore the Durand Line. In essence, while Pakistani and Indian competition in
Kashmir made a previously theoretical border into fact, Afghan and Pakistani competition along
the Durand Line undermined its already fragile nature, reflecting a local reality where neither
country was truly sovereign over the local population, despite the presence of an international
border.
Development was a key way in which the Indian and Pakistani states attempted to
demonstrate materially their claims to sovereignty. Outside contested areas such as Kashmir and
, development in 1950s South Asia predominantly meant large-scale
schemes to improve infrastructure, heavy industry, and import-substitution manufacturing (see
Roy 2007; Cullather 2010). In Pakistan, development schemes were similarly important to
images of legitimacy (see Daechsel 2015). Afghanistan lagged behind, only completing
several moderately successful five-year plans with the help of Soviet financing and technical
expertise (Cullather 2010, chapter four; Leake 2016).
In Kashmir and along the Durand Line, development activities took on additional
-Year Plans, the calling-cards of Nehruvian
developmentalism, included Kashmir (Rushbrook-Williams 1957, 26). Indian official
correspondence discussed developing water resources in Jammu and Kashmir (NAI 1954c).
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Similarly the Pakistan government
dam at Mirpur from the late 1950s, exercised de facto sovereignty. Islamabad pressed ahead with
the project despite significant opposition from local residents, disregarding supposed Kashmiri
self-determination. In July 1957, for instance, a public meeting in Mirpur passed a resolution
demanding that a plebiscite on the future of Kashmir precede construction work on the dam.
Some residents observed a partial hartal, or boycott of shops and businesses. The Pakistan and
Azad Kashmir governments responded by calling further public meetings in order to put across
pro-dam perspectives (NDC 1957b). Nevertheless, dam work progressed
Kashmir Affairs also promoted smaller-scale development projects such as agricultural extension
and forestry (NDC 1957a). Such initiatives performed Pakistani custodianship over Kashmir to
Pakistani as well as Kashmiri audiences, promotion of
(Dawn 1957b). The ceasefire line dividing Indian and Pakistani development activities in
Kashmir, while officially temporary, in practice served as a border separating two sovereign
powers.
Development was equally important along the Durand Line (for an Indian comparison,
see Guyot-Réchard 2013). Pakistani officials sought to strengthen ties with the tribal zone and
integrate the NWFP into the Pakistani state. Despite economic constraints after partition, the
government took new steps to improve circumstances in both the tribal area and settled districts
through developing roads, cottage industries, and agricultural initiatives (NAI 1954c). As the
the development schemes, which will result in lasting benefit for the tribal people [ ] in the
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Specifically referring to the ongoing dispute with Afghanistan, the Secretary to the Government
of West Pakistan,
Pakistani development efforts also forced the Afghan Government to follow suit; as one
d). But
the extremely poor Afghan Government could not match the foreign aid pouring into Pakistan
from the United States, even as it increasingly received support from the Soviet Union. The
[...]. If the Afghanistan Government or Pakhtunistan movement could remedy this malady, this
area could be saved otherwise later or sooner, hunger would make the people submit to Pakistan
The British Deputy Commissioner in
Peshawar noted that al
road-building with Soviet aid, they did less to create economic opportunities west of the Durand
Line. The Line served as the limit to Pakistani development, and in the starkest terms
differentiated Pakistani from Afghan development capacities.
Revising governing relationships provided another means for potentially integrating these
peripheral regions. Indian officials pursued political ties between Indian-held Kashmir and the
rest of the country, though Pakistani leaders outwardly appeared more reticent, in part because of
their official policy of supporting Kashmiri self-
provision of special, autonomous status for Jammu and Kashmir, India gradually incorporated
the State through acts such as the abolition of customs tariffs in 1954 (Schofield 1996, chapter
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state and Prime Minister would be renamed Governor and Chief Minister, respectively (NAI
1963). This move subordinated the State's administration to the Indian Union by removing
symbols of autonomy. Taken together, these steps attempted to materialize the Indian
leade
state and British India had dissolved; India claimed legal sovereignty over the whole former
Jammu and Kashmir State but settled for de facto control of Jammu and the Valley.
In contrast, Pakistan claimed no formal ownership of Azad Kashmir, but a 1952
Kashmir Affairs to veto legislation passed by the Azad Kashmir Council (Rushbrook-Williams
1957)
policymaking positions, much like the building of the Mangla dam, also demonstrated that
de facto sovereignty over the state contradicted its espoused support for an
(see Sneddon 2011, chapter four).
In contrast to these obvious attempts to link the Kashmiri peripheries to the center,
Pakistan took a more cautious approach to its northwest frontier rejected any
policy that emphasized Pashtun (or other) ethnic difference within Pakistan. The central
by Pakistani Pashtun leader Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Ayub Khan, once president, similarly rejected
the idea of establishing a Pashtun administrative unit within West Pakistan:
to build up a wider national consciousness[,] there would be no such concessions to regional
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But despite Liaquat Ali Khan's reference to locals
little to effect political integration. Besides the 1951 establishment of the Mohmand Agency,
which introduced one additional Pakistani political agent in the tribal area, few other political
policy was to bring social and economic progress to the people of the tribal areas, with the
ultimate aim of bringing them up to the level of development of the rest of the country and, by
implication, to make them full- . Officials did not, however, believe they
could replace the local jirga system of governance - which left tribal councils to resolve disputes
between and within tribal society - without facing widespread resistance (NARA 1955c; see
Verkaaik, Khan and Rehman 2012 on persisting legal differences between the tribal area and
Pakistan's provinces
interventions into Azad Kashmiri politics, epitomised by the ease with which the Ministry of
Kashmir Affairs dismissed presidents of the nominally autonomous state six times between 1950
and 1959 (Sneddon 2011, 90).
Unable to engage in any real economic competition with Pakistan, Afghan leaders instead
turned to political organization to mobilize transborder Pashtun support. Afghan leaders
organized frequent jirgas in the Eastern Provinces, as well as occasional larger meetings in
Kabul, where they promoted support for Pashtunistan and anti-Pakistan action and doled out
1960
intervention across the Durand Line, the Afghan governor in Jalalabad invited a large jirga from
across the Durand Line to Nangarhar Province to reaffirm his support for Pashtunistan; he
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became an annual holiday celebrated in Kabul and other major Afghan cities, with parades and
public broadcasts. Afghan leaders also helped the Faqir of Ipi, a mullah
area and a key promoter of Pashtunistan, to design and produce a Pashtunistan flag.
local loyalties through
areas continued to receive subsidies from both governments, and differentiating between tribes
- - -
-
Afghan armed forces occurred on both sides of the border. Officials in both countries maintained
that they had tribal loyalty, but their reports inevitably clashed, undermining their plausibility.
The Pakistani political agent in South Waziristan, for example, assured his government that
-Pakistan.
Although individual Mahsuds can be bought by Kabul, their prudence will not allow them to
Pakistani press carried regular
reports of tribal jirgas demanding that Afghanistan stop interfering in the tribal zone (NAI 1953;
NARA 1952a; NARA 1952b).
In contrast, the Afghan press emphasized Pashtun resistance to Pakistani governance. In
1955, for example, the Afghan press reported on May 8 that a jirga of Pashtuns on the Afghan
side of the border had condemned One Unit, the establishment of a unified West Pakistan. Local
mullahs ties informing
people no sacrifice [
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telling, during the 1960 border conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, local lashkars, or war
parties, in the autonomous tribal area fought against both Afghan and Pakistani forces.
Afghanistan and Pakistan than either state cared to recognise. Despite a legal status (albeit
disputed), the Durand Line counted for little.
The ceasefire line in Kashmir was the inverse of the Durand Line. Rather than an official
but nominal boundary that development and governance relationships crossed with impunity, the
ceasefire line divided Indian- and Pakistan-sponsored activities in Kashmir. As the Line of
Control, it still forms the de facto border, running through approximately 500 miles of mainly
mountainous country (Korbel 1953, 503). Kashmir was a distinctively militarised landscape,
unlike the Durand Line where state military presences were irregular. UN observers were also
stationed along the ceasefire line to check that no major violence occurred. According to one
observer, India tended to treat its side of the line as a military area, whereas civilian agricultural
activity on the Azad Kashmir side reached up to the line itself (Rushbrook-Williams 1957, 30).
As with the Durand Line, civilians were known to cross the line in both directions. In
Kashmir, however, such transgressions drew fire from opposing soldiers (Lourie 1955, 29). The
zone around the line was therefore a mix of military no- -land and civil frontier. Such
Pakistani daily Dawn claimed in 1962 that Indian military authorities had warned Muslims living
across the border remained open: the boundary fence, extant today, did not exist before 2004.
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and Pakistani spheres of authority, it carried grave risks. The ceasefire line, then, formed both the
physical and symbolic division between Indian and Pakistani space far more effectively than did
the Durand Line between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Conclusion
The issue of territorial sovereignty and security had resonance across the broader
decolonizing world, far beyond the Kashmir and Durand Line disputes. For many of the
anticolonial leaders who became new national heads of state not only in South Asia but
elsewhere territorial sovereignty was key. For the most part, they had inherited the roughly-
drawn colonial boundaries, and sought to maintain and strengthen them as national spaces. A
territorial presence also meant a seat in the United Nations and formal recognition from former
colonial powers and fledgling postcolonial states. Borders dictated the spaces where new leaders
could focus their development efforts, increasingly drawing on financial and technical support
from the United States and Soviet Union. In short, the territorially-contained nation-state
provided the space for leaders to create national identities and national projects, identifying those
colonial inheritances they chose to keep, as well as those they eagerly terminated. Borders were
crucial for denoting where one nation ended and another began.
However, border disputes complicated the process of state-building, and the territorial
sovereignty accepted by one new nation was not necessarily recognized by others. These
sovereignty disputes were evident in both South Asian case studies, as well as in other instances
27
Kashmir conflicted with the realities of
a divided state. Similar situations emerged in other areas of the decolonizing world, whether
Korea, where the 38th parallel arbitrarily divided populations that shared ethnic, cultural, and
familial ties into two states, much like Kashmir's ceasefire line; Cambodia and Laos, whose
shared border haphazardly divided ethnic groups between the new countries; or the Congo or
Nigeria, where irredentist communities attempted to draw new borders matching ethnic zones.
Decolonization and postcolonial state-building transmuted flexible, ill-defined colonial
boundaries into firmer borders, often complicating relations between, and within, postcolonial
states. Some new citizens did not acknowledge the sanctity of newly national borders, which did
not match local livelihoods and pre-existing subnational and transnational identities. But state
officials frequently refused to recognize these alternative identities and pushed forward with
initiatives that emphasized a unitary state-based polity. Understanding state sovereignty after
decolonization must recognise that despite the importance of local identities, elite conceptions of
borders have frequently been paramount in directing the ways states have addressed their
borderlands populations.
Yet despite wider resonances of postcolonial border-making, the specific histories of the
ceasefire line in Kashmir and the Durand Line conditioned their impacts on state sovereignty.
The multiple and competing geographical imaginaries that characterized Indian and Pakistani
claims on Kashmir turned the latter into a borderland on a much broader scale than those
addressed in borderlands literature on other parts of South Asia. At stake in the Kashmir dispute
was not sovereignty over relatively small areas of land near shifting riverbeds, regulation of
While Reece Jones has argued that movement across the India-Bangladesh border today
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demonstrates that neither "India" nor "Bangladesh" are fixed and finalized categories, Indian and
de
facto sovereignty while leaving open de jure possibilities such as plebiscites and partitions
(Jones 2011). The Durand Line, by contrast, figured in policy mainly because it could not
The key difference was that of history: the aftermath of decolonization created a new border in
Kashmir, but merely added another chapter to the long history of the Durand Line. Their
specificity meant that states could not engage a single logic of sovereignty or governing
rationale. Border drawing and ruling were contingent. Future work could usefully integrate other
South Asian borders into a more fully trans-Asian perspective, for example the China-India and
Bangladesh-Myanmar frontiers.
Nevertheless, we must recognize the extent to which these two borders featured in elite
conceptions of state territoriality, despite the fact that lived realities in these borderlands did not
match state-level perspectives. On a certain level the fact that borders disrupted everyday lives
in the case of the ceasefire line in Kashmir or were only lightly in place as at the Durand Line
potential for fluidity and uncertainty, their rhetorics and action only made sense so long as each
state assumed that asserting (even limited) control over a given territory was a possible,
desirable, even necessary, goal. The exercise of sovereignty, regardless of its logic but expressed
through development and governance activities, required a bounded space that only borders
could provide.
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